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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. Case No: 20170552-CA 
TODD MULLINER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
**** 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e) as an appeal from a court of record 
in a criminal case not involving a first degree or capital felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the district court erred when it ruled on Mulliner's motion to 
correct an illegal sentence. "Whether a sentence is illegal 'presents a question of 
~ law that [the appellate court will] review for correctness."' State v. Vaughn, 2011 
UT App 411, ,Jg, (quoting State v. Dana, 2010 UT App 374, ,I3, 246 P.3d 756). This 
issue was preserved in the district court by Mulliner's motion to correct an illegal 
sentence and the arguments made in support. R.138; R.248-278. 
CONTROLLING STATIITORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendant, Todd Mulliner, appeals from the judgment, sentence, and 
commitment on one count of Sale of Unregistered Security, a third degree felony, 
and one count of Securities Fraud, a third degree felony. Specifically, Mulliner 
appeals from the 2nd Corrected Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment order 
issued by Judge Low on June 26, 2017, following Mulliner's motion to correct an 
illegal sentence. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
On November 18, 2003, Todd Mulliner was charged by information with two 
counts of Sale of Unregistered Securities, third degree felonies under Utah Code 
§61-1-7 and §91-1-21, two counts of Securities Fraud, third degree felonies under 
Utah Code §61-1-1, and two counts of Sale of Security by Unlicensed Broker-Dealer, 
third degree felonies under Utah Code §61-1-3. R.001-02. During the time of the <iii 
prosecution in this case, Mulliner was in the custody of the Utah Department of 
Corrections and serving a prison sentence at the Utah State Prison on a case from 
St. George. R.007; R.013; R.018, etc. 
After waiving his preliminary hearing, Mulliner plead no contest to Counts 
1 and 2, and the remaining counts were dismissed. R.018-19; R.020-29. The 
written statement in advance of plea characterized the "plea bargain" as follows: 
"Defendant agrees to pay $3,000 in Restitution." R.024. No other agreements or 
sentencing recommendations are contained within the plea statement. 
2 
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On March 17, 2004, Mulliner was sentenced to serve "an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State prison" on each count. R.031. Judge 
Schofield's order required one count to run concurrent and one count consecutive. 1 
On April 17, 2013 the court filed a letter from Mulliner wherein he 
complained that the court clerk "wrote up the sentence and commitment orders 
incorrectly". R.037. It doesn't appear that the court did anything with this letter. 
Two years later, on October 23, 2105, Mulliner filed his "Rule 22(e) Motion 
to Correct an Illegal Sentence." R.040. Attached as an exhibit to the memorandum, 
Mulliner provided a typed transcript of the sentencing hearing prepared by 
Mulliner's brother. 2 The State responded and argued that the sentence was not 
illegal because, although Judge Schofield was not explicit, the court meant to order 
Count 1 and Count 2 would run concurrently, and therefore his concurrent 
sentences on Counts 1 and 2 had already been served. R.057-58. Judge Laycock 
held oral argument on February 3, 2016. R.074, R.103-26. The court acknowledged 
that the sentence contained a clerical error and was illegal for failing to designate 
whether Count 1 and 2 were concurrent or consecutive. R.122-23. The court issued 
a corrected sentencing order. R.078-79. 
Two days later, Mulliner filed a pro se "New Motion to Correct the New 
1 The record of Judge Schofield's oral order was either unclear or contradictory on 
this point for reasons explained below. 
~ 2 Judge Laycock "accept[ed] the transcript prepared by the defendant's brother." 
R.075. See also R.121-22 ("with the State's acquiescence I'm going to take the 
defendant's brother's transcript of the video tape at face value."). 
3 
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Illegal Sentence, Rule 22(e) and Rule 3o(b)". R.082-84. In this motion, Mulliner 
explained that the corrected sentence was illegal because Count 1 and Count 2 were Ci) 
ordered to run concurrently while Count 1 was to run concurrent to the St. George 
case and Count 2 was to run consecutive to the St. George case. R.082. According 
to Mulliner's motion, this would require the sentence on Count 2 to run twice. 
R.082. On February 22, 2016, Judge Laycock denied the new motion because it 
"contains no arguments that have not already been considered by the court." 
R.087. Judge Laycock found that "(n]othing in the Utah statutes or case law 
prohibits this court's interpretation of Judge Schofield's original order or this 
court's correction of his flawed order." R.090. Judge Laycock characterized her 
ruling as "a final order from which the defendant can file a notice of appeal within 
the next 30 days." R.090. 
On March 11, 2016, Mulliner filed a pro se Notice of Appeal. R.092. The 
appeal was numbered by this Court as 20160190-CA but was summarily affirmed 
without briefing because the Court characterized Mulliner's "New Motion" as a 
motion to reconsider, which did not toll the time to file a notice of appeal from 
Judge Laycock's February 3, 2016 ruling. R.098-99. Because Mulliner's notice of 
appeal was filed within 30 days of Judge Laycock's second order, but not filed 
within 30 days of the February 3 ruling, his appeal was dismissed as untimely. 
On April 12, 2017, Mulliner, now represented by the Utah County Public 
Defender Association, filed another Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, this 
time to Judge Thomas Low, as Judge Laycock had retired. R.138-50. In that motion 
4 
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Mulliner claimed that the sentence issued by Judge Laycock was illegal because it 
@ was internally contradictory and that the sentence should be corrected to be legal 
and consistent with Judge Schofield's original sentence. The State did not respond 
to Mulliner's written motion and he filed a notice to submit along with a proposed 
order (R.200, 202), but Judge Low set the case for oral argument on June 7, 2017. 
Mulliner objected to the State presenting any arguments because it had not 
responded to the motion. R.250. Judge Low denied the objection because he had 
"to do the right thing" and wanted "as much help" and he could get. R.251. 
On June 26, 2017, Judge Low granted Mulliner's motion insofar as he found 
Judge Laycock's order was internally contradictory. However, Judge Low did not 
adopt Mulliner's proposed solution, and instead issued the 2nd Corrected 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment order requiring Count 2 to run consecutive to 
Count 1, while Count 1 runs concurrent with the St. George case, and Count 2 runs 
consecutive to the St. George case. R.217. 
On July 12, 2017, Mulliner filed timely notice of appeal from Judge Law's 
June 27, 2017 order. R.232. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Judge Schofield's initial sentencing order 
After Mulliner no contest one count of third degree felony Sale of 
Unregistered Security and one count of third degree felony Securities Fraud, his 
case was referred to Adult Probation and Parole for a presentence investigation 
report. R.018-19. The court ordered "[a] short report to be prepared in regards to 
5 
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consecutive vs. concurrent." R.019. The presentence investigation report prepared 
and filed by AP&P did not make any explicit recommendation "in regards to 
consecutive vs. concurrent", and instead only recommended "the subject be 
sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison ... " R.296. At sentencing on March 14, 2004, Judge Schofield orally 
pronounced Mulliner's sentence as follows: 
In the matter number 20 on the calendar on each of the third degree 
felonies it will be the order of the Court that this defendant server (sic) 
an indeterminate term of not more than five years in the Utah State 
Prison, an an (sic) order additionally you pay restitution in the sum of 
$2975, that you not hold any positions of fiduciary responsibility. I am 
going to order that Count 1 of the matter run concurrent to the other 
time you are serving and that Count 2 run consecutive so that you will 
have one concurrent and one consecutive sentence so that there is 
some modicum of separate accountability. (Inaudible ... ) Board of 
Pardon will figure out what to do with that (Inaudible ... ). 
R.153-54.3 The written sentencing order did not accurately describe Judge 
Schofield's oral sentence in that it transposed the language for Count 1 with the 
language for Count 2. "The sentence for count 1 is to run consecutive to the time 
the defendant is now serving. Count 2 is to run concurrent with the time the 
defendant is now serving." R.031. 
Judge Laycock's corrected sentencing order 
After receiving Mulliner's pro se motion to correct the illegal sentence, 
wherein Mulliner claimed Judge Schofield's sentence was illegal because it failed 
3 Note that Judge Schofield otherwise followed AP&P's recommendation exactly 'i1 
by ordering $2975.00 in restitution and ordering Mulliner not hold any positions 
of fiduciary responsibility. R.296. 
6 ® 
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to address how Count 1 and Count 2 would relate to each other and it contained 
@ clerical errors because the 2 counts had been switched, Judge Laycock agreed and 
orally issued the following order: 
So I have two counts here. One is a sale of unregistered security, a 
third degree felony. I will order that -- and I'm giving you the benefit 
under part (a), because Judge Schofield didn't address it, I think the 
only fair thing at this point is to do is to assume that he meant 
concurrent. I think to do otherwise is not fair to you. So I'm going to 
make it concurrent. So I will order that those two zero to fives will run 
concurrent with each other. That takes care of part (a). 
Under part (b) I will do what I think was his intent. That Count I, 
which is sale of unregistered security, will run concurrently with the 
St. George case, and hang on, I want to put that exact number -- have 
to find it ... 
Okay, it will run concurrently with case No. 991500379. That's Count 
I. County II will run consecutively to case No. 991500379. What I'm 
going to do, I'm going to make this an amended sentencing. 
R.124-25. The relevant portion of Judge Laycock's written amended sentencing 
recorded these matters as follows: 
Court orders the defendant serve no more than five years on each third 
degree felony, concurrently with each other. 
Count 1 will run concurrently with the St. George matter, 
#991500379. Count 2 will run consecutively to case #991500379. 
R.075. 
Judge Low's 2nd corrected sentencing order 
Following Mulliner's motion to correct Judge Laycock's sentence Judge Low 
issued a written ruling and a 2nd amended sentencing order. In the ruling Judge 
Low decided to "simply restore Defendant's original sentence" and vacate Judge 
Laycock's amended sentence R.224, 228. Judge Low found Judge Schofield's 
7 
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original sentence was "not ambiguous" and that it "was clearly the court's intention 
to require one of the counts in this case to run consecutively to Defendant's 
previous sentence." R.225. Apparently, according to Judge Low, Judge Schofield's 
lack of clarity was due to a "grammatical parallelism." R. 225. Judge Low found that 
the only correction to Judge Schofield's initial sentence was necessary, that being 
to order Count 1 and Count 2 to run consecutively, because, according to Judge 
Low, "[t]here is simply no other way for count 1 to run concurrently with 
Defendant's previous sentence and for count 2 to run consecutively to it." R.227-
28. Judge Low's ruling ordered as follows: 
Defendant's sentence is corrected to require that he serve zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison on each of the two third-degree felonies 
in this case, that Count 2 run consecutively to count 1, that count 1 run 
concurrently with Defendant's sentence in case number 991500379, 
and that count 2 run consecutively to Defendant's sentence in case 
number 991500379. 
R.229-30. Judge Low also issued a 2nd Corrected Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment order describing the amended sentence as: 
R.217. 
The prison time on count two is to run consecutively to count one. The 
prison time on count one is to run concurrently with the prison time 
on case number 991500379. The prison time on count two is to run 
consecutively to the prison time on case 991500379. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in attempting to correct Judge Laycock's illegal 
sentence. Judge Low's 2nd Corrected Sentence, Judgment, Commitment order is 
illegal because it is ambiguous, internally contradictory, and defies the meanings 
8 
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of the words it purports to use. Count 1 and Count 2 can be neither consecutive nor 
@ concurrent while Count 1 in concurrent to the St. George matter and Count 2 is 
consecutive to the St. George matter. Judge Low's attempt to "restore" an illegal 
sentence created yet another illegal sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CORRECTING AN ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE 
A. Rule 22(e) and Illegal Sentences 
In April of 2017, when Mulliner filed his second Motion to Correct an Illegal 
'@ Sentence, Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provided that "[t]he 
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, 
at any time." UTAH R. CR. P. 22(e) (2016).4 An illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, has been interpreted as "one which is ambiguous 
with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally 
contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to 
the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction 
did not authorize." State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ,I13, 203 P.3d 984 (quoting United 
States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
Mulliner's claims of illegality have changed as the various versions of his 
sentence have been issued. For example, initially, when he challenged Judge 
4 The Utah Supreme Court later amended Rule 22 to limit the specific instances 
when the court can correct a sentence and included a timing element to several 
kinds of corrections. That amendment became effective May 1, 2017. See UTAH R. 
CR. P. 22 (2017). 
9 
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Schofield's written order, Mulliner claimed the sentence must be corrected because 
it failed to designate the relationship between Count 1 and Count 2, as required by 
§76-3-401(1), and that it contained a clerical error by confusing what Judge 
Schofield said about Count 1 with Count 2, and vice versa. See R.041-42; R.061-63. 
After Judge Laycock issued her amended sentence, Mulliner's claims of illegality 
then addressed the internal contradiction between having Count 1 and Count 2 run 
concurrently, while having Count 1 run concurrent with the St. George case and 
Count 2 run consecutive to the St. George case. See R. 
Now that Judge Low has amended Judge Laycock's order, Mulliner claims 
his sentence is illegal because it is again internally contradictory (in a new way) or 
because it is ambiguous as to the time and manner in which it is to be served. 
B. This sentence is both ambiguous and internally contradictory 
The terms "concurrent" and "consecutive" are not defined in the relevant 
statute by the legislature. See Utah Code §76-3-401. Merriam-Webster online @ 
defines the word consecutive as "following one after the other in order; 
successive".s This definition gains meaning when compared to the dictionary 
definition of the word concurrent, which is "operating or occurring at the same 
time" and "running parallel".6 Another helpful comparison is found in Black's Law 
which defines consecutive sentences as: 
s See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consecutive (last accessed 
October 21, 2017). 
6 See https://WV\rw.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/concurrent (last accessed 
October 21, 2017). 
10 
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"[t]wo or more sentences of jail time in sequence. For example, if a 
convicted criminal receives consecutive sentences of 20 years and 5 
years, the total amount of jail time is 25 years. -- Also termed 
cumulative sentences; back-to-back sentences; accumulative 
sentences." 
Consecutive sentences, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Black's Law defines 
concurrent sentences as: 
"[t]wo or more sentences of jail time to be served simultaneously. For 
example, if a convicted criminal receives concurrent sentences of 5 
years and 15 years, the total amount of jail time is 15 years." 
Concurrent sentences, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
The Utah Code does provide some information about how concurrent 
sentences are to be treated. For example, Utah Code §76-3-401(9) provides that 
" [ w ]hen a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with 
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the 
longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served." This statute 
could be more clear about when a concurrent sentence begins running, but perhaps 
that question is so obvious, it needs not be explicitly described by the legislature. 
Mulliner asserts that if a sentence is ordered to run concurrently with a sentence 
that is already being served, the new sentence begins running the moment it is 
issued. This idea is supported in many cases from around the country. 
For example, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that"[ w ]hen two sentences 
run concurrently, it merely means that, for each day in custody while serving both 
sentences, the inmate receives credit toward each sentence." Bullard v. 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Department of Corrections, 949 P.2d 999, 1002 (Col. 1997).1This idea is expanded 
upon by the Ohio Court of Appeals; "where a sentence is imposed concurrently 
with a sentence that has already been imposed, and which the defendant has 
already begun serving, the defendant is given the comparative luxury of serving 
each day of his second sentence, beginning with the first day, concurrently with a 
day served on the first sentence. Thus, if the new sentence is imposed and put into 
execution on the 100th day of the old sentence, the defendant is allowed to serve 
the first day of his new sentence while, at the same time, serving the 100th day of 
the old sentence." Ohio v. Ways, 2013-Ohio-293, ,I10 (Ohio App. 2013). 8 
In contrast, "[ w ]here a sentence is imposed consecutively to a sentence that 
has already been imposed, and which the defendant has already begun serving, the 
defendant must complete the first sentence before he can begin serving day one of 
the second sentence." Ways, 2013-Ohio-293, ,I10. 
Several principles important to this case emerge from these definitions and ~ 
cases. First is the principle that consecutive sentences must be performed in 
orderly succession and in sequence. There can be no break between consecutive 
sentences, they run back-to-back where the first sentence ends at the end of its last 
7 See also Brinklow v. Riveland, 773 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo. 1989) ("A concurrent 
sentence is one which runs simultaneously, in whole or in part, with another 
sentence... The fact that sentences run concurrently merely means that the 
prisoner is given the privilege of serving each day a portion of each sentence.") 
(emphasis added); People v. Taylor, 7 P.3d 1030, 1-32 (Colo. App. 2000); Fleming-
Pancione v. Menard, 2017 vr 59, ,I,I16-17. 
8 See also Washington v. Arizona, 456 P.2d 415, 417 (Ariz. App. 1969) (concurrent 
sentences run simultaneously, the second sentence begins the day it is issued). 
12 
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day and the second sentence begins at the start of the next day. When the first 
@ sentence in a consecutive pair ends, the next imm~.Oiqtely begif!~d?.th~rwise, they 
are not consecutive. 
The second principle is that when sentences run concurrently, every day 
served counts as credit against each of the sentences. So, if a person is serving 5 
years on one sentence and concurrently serving 15 years on a second, he gets credit 
against the 5 year sentence for each day during the first five years, and then that 5 
year sentence is finished and the 15 year sentence continues on its own. After both 
sentences have been issued, every single day counts against each concurrent term. 
And although one sentence may end before the other, both sentences are active 
from the beginning. 
These principles demonstrate why Judge Law's sentence is problematic, why 
it is ambiguous or internally contradictory; these principles demonstrate why it is 
~ illegal. The first portion of Judge Law's order is that Count 1 was ordered to run 
concurrent to the St. George case. R.230. According to the definition of concurrent 
sentences and the cases interpreting that term, Count 1 began to run on March 17, 
2004 (the day it was imposed), for a maximum of 5 years, along with the St. George 
case, which had already begun on July 2, 2003. In practical terms, because Count 
1 was issued on March 17, 2004 and it was for not more than 5 years, the sentence 
in Count 1 ended, at the latest, on March 16, 2009, while the St. George case 
continued on until, at the latest, July 1, 2018. See Table 1 below for a visual 
representation of the relationship between Count 1 and the St. George case. 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Table 1. 
July 2, 2003 July 1, 2018 
l l 
• 
St ~rge case (1-15 ~) I 
'I 
Count 1 (0-5 years) 
i i 
March 17, 2004 March 16, 2009 
According to the second portion of Judge Law's order, Count 1 and Count 2 
were ordered to run consecutively. R.230. And according to the definition of 
consecutive sentences, Count 2 began to run immediately after Count 1 ended. As 
mentioned above, Count 1 ended, at the latest, on March 16, 2009. Therefore, in 
order to be consecutive with Count 1, to run back-to-back, Count 2 began, at the 
latest, on March 17, 2009 and ran no more than 5 years. Because Count 2 is ordered 
to run consecutive to Count 1, the latest Count 2 could end was March 16, 2014. 
See Table 2 below for a visual representation of the relationship between Count 1 
and Count 2. 
Table 2. 
July 2, 2003 July 1, 2018 
l l 
l i i 
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Here's wh.er~ the problem be_gin~. J uqg~ .. LPW.. c;i.lso. ordered Gq_upt .7 a.nc;l the 
St. George case to run consecutively. R .230. Again, according to the definition of 
consecutive sentences, Count 2 cannot begin to run until immediately after St. 
George sentence ends. If the St. George sentence runs the entire 15 years, it is set 
to end July 1, 2018. In order for Count 2 to be consecutive to the St. George 
sentence, Count 2 will not begin until immediately after the St. George sentence 
ends, or at the latest, on July 2, 2018. See Table 3 below for a visual representation 
of the relationship between Count 2 and the St. George case, combined with the 
relationships between the other counts. 
Table 3 . 
July 2, 2003 July 1, 2018 July 11 2023 
l 1 
St George case (1-15 :,ears) 
.,. . ' ·~ 
·0>unt a(o-smrsJ~ 
. • . · -· . .,i l 
i i i 
M.arch 17, 2004 March 16, 11009 March 16, 2014 
But as Table 3 makes clear, Count 2 is running twice, and this is illegal. 
Count 2 cannot have begun on March 17, 2009 and ended on March 16, 2014 only 
to be resurrected and begin again on July 2, 2018. And yet, according to Judge 
Low's order, it is required to do so. According to Judge Low's order, Count 2 must 
be consecutive to Count 1 while also being consecutive to the St. George sentence, 
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all the while, Count 1 and the St. George sentence ran concurrently, with Count 1 
beginning on March 17, 2004. Thus, Judge Low's sentence is either ambiguous, 
meaning that it is subject to multiple interpretations because either Count 2 begins 
on March 17, 2009 or it begins on July 2, 2018, or it is internally inconsistent 
because it orders Count 2 to begin and after it has already ended. 
Given Judge Low's order, the Department of Corrections has to decide 
whether it will follow the portion of the order that requires Count 2 to begin 
immediately after Count 1 ends, or instead to follow the portion of Judge Law's 
order that requires Count 2 to begin immediately after the St. George sentence ® 
ends. It may come as no surprise that the Board of Pardons had decided honor the 
part of Judge Low's sentence requiring Count 2 to run consecutive to St. George, 
ignoring Count 2's relationship with Count 1. This was also true when the prison 
applied Judge Laycock's order as well. Even though Judge Laycock's order 
explicitly required Count 2 to run concurrently with Count 1, the Board of Pardons 
ignored that portion of the order to make sure Count 2 run after St. George. These 
examples demonstrate the illegality of the sentence, they demonstrate how these 
sentences are either ambiguous as to the time and manner of service, or how the 
sentences are internally contradictory. 
The State is likely to claim this sentence is no different than a hypothetical (10;; 
case where the defendant is convicted on 3 counts in one case, and each count is 
ordered to run consecutive to each other count. Presumably, such an order creates 
no ambiguity or contradiction. In that case the first sentence would run until it 
16 
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ends, then the second sentence would immediately begin and run until it ends, 
might argue that the first sentence and the third sentence are still consecutive to 
each other even though they are not back-to-back. The State may suggest that 
because that order is not illegal, neither is the sentence in this appeal illegal. But 
there is a significant distinction between these two scenarios, 
C. This Court should correct the illegal sentence 
Rule 22(e) authorizes this Court to correct the illegal sentence, rather than 
remanding to the district court for resentencing. After all, this Court is on equal 
footing with the current district court with respect to how to issue a legal sentence, 
because the original sentencing court has been retired for years. Both the current 
district court and this Court would review the same record, the same statutes, and 
the same case law. Therefore, for the sake of judicial efficiency this Court should 
correct Mulliner' s sentence. 
The proper way to construe Judge Schofield's sentencing order, which 
follows the law, accounts for the meaning of each of terms used and the logical 
relationships between, and which does not result in an illegal sentence, is to amend 
the sentencing order as follows: 
Count 1 and Count 2 will run consecutive to each other, beginning on 
March 17, 2004. The sentences in this case will run concurrent with 
the sentence in Case 991500379 (St. George case). 
17 
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As argued to Judge Low below,9 this constructions accounts for all of Judge 
Schofield's terms, follows the statute and meanings of the relevant terms, and does 
not created an illegal sentence. Therefore, this should be the sentence. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because Judge Low's sentence is illegal it must be corrected. In light of the 
meaning of the relevant terms, statutes, and case law, as well as Judge Schofield's 
initial oral order, the sentence should be corrected as described above. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of October, 2017. 
Isl Douglas Thompson 
Appointed Appellate Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(f) 
I certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Rule 24(f) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The total word count of this brief is 
5,049. It was prepared in Microsoft Word. 
/sl Douglas Thompson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I emailed a copy of the foregoing brief and mailed two paper 
copies, postage prepaid, to the Utah State Attorney General, Appeals Division, 
criminalappeals@agutah.gov, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
on this 24th day of October, 2017 
Isl Douglas Thompson 
9 See R.259 ("We think Count 1 and Count 2 should be consecutive to each other 
and concurrent with the other case. That would give effect to all of the language in 
Judge Schofield's initial order and make a, a sentence that is not illegal. I don't 
think any other construction of this sentence can do that, can make it, can account 
for the language and not make an illegal sentence."). 
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Utah Code 
76-3-401 Concurrent or consecutive sentences -- Limitations -- Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony 
offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. The court 
shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
@ (a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other 
sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall 
consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, 
@ character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later offense is 
committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court finds and states on 
the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to run 
~ consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request clarification from 
the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment 
stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode 
as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(j (6) 
(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed 
may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a maximum 
@ sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs after his 
initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
<@ (b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior to 
imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing court 
or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present 
offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
~ (8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive 
sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole 
shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that consists of the 
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is 
~ considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the 
aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other 
or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer remaining 
(i) imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual consecutive 
sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to 
limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
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Utah Code 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive 
sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 , the sentence has not been terminated or 
((j voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
Amended by Chapter 129, 2002 General Session 
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State of Utah 
Vs. 
Todd D Mulliner 
Case # 031404403 
Transcript of the above captioned Hearing that took place on 3/17/2004 in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court with Judge Haycock presiding is as follows: 
Judge: "Number 20, Todd Mulliner. This matter is before the Court for sentencJ. 
I have reviewed the pre-sentencing report for you Todd is there anything 
you wish to say?" 
Attorney for Mulliner: "We do not find any errors in the report other than they have 
his plea as guilty, not no contest. 
Judge: "It was a no contest, ok. 
Attorney for Mulliner: "Your Honor, as for the recommendation, they are I 
recommending that he server zero to five. (Inaudible ... ) "we recommenb 
that he serve concurrent with what he is already serving. Right now in ! 
prison he is a tutor, a math and science tutor. He has attended all of the 
classes he has been asked to do. And he is also in group therapy. He is 
basically doing everything he can do to learn everything he can from the , 
system before he gets out. He has lots of skills. He knows he can be a 
productive member of society. He has a college degree. He has the ability 
to get a very good job. We request that this run concurrent so that when h 
gets out he can get out sooner and that he can start paying the restitution 
amount. We do not object to the restitution amount. We don;t object to 
anything else in the report." 
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Attorney for the State of Utah: "Your Honor, we would request consecutive 
sentences. The Defendant is already in custody on previous matters and in 
order to get a consequence for this case we feel like consecutive sentences 1 
would be appropriate. So, that is the only difference we have." 
Judge: "Anything you want to say Mr. Mulliner before I impose a sentence 
today?" 
Mr. Mulliner: "Yes your honor. I appreciate the opportunity. (Inaudible, .. ) "with I 
number two, having no fiduciary responsibility. I'll tell you what, I 
couldn't agree more with that. I don't want any fiduciary responsibility. 
(Inaudible ... ) Regarding restitution, as my attorney has properly 
represented, not only is it my extreme desire to do so, I have willingness 
and capability are sometimes two different things but I will be highly 
capable of making restitution in all of my matters. My criminal past is very 
sad. If there is anyone in here (Inaudible ... ) I am very sorry about that. 
(Inaudible ... ) My desire to not make any excuse whatsoever and to take , 
full responsibility. And, ah, I pray the Court will see the wisdom (inaudibl~ 
... ). Just a quick note, I have a fiance, we have discussed in detail, in fact; 
I 
we have a written financial plan in place, a six or seven year type plan, l 
which is the reason why I am so confident in my ability to pay restitution \ 
because it involves her heavily. She is currently financially stable and self-I 
sustaining and for the most part will remain that way. In our family life she. 
would be the main provider to the family (Inaudible ... ) 
Anyway, other than my extreme sorrow, and in this particular case, again, aj 
the risk of sounding like I'm mitigating, it was actually a sincere effort on 
my part, when I went to prison, when I was remanded to prison in July of 
last year, it was that specifically which caused these people to have 
heartache over what was going on. Though it is was against the law I 
understand now but at the time my intention was sincere, it wasn't a 
complaint or problem until I disappeared that the issue surfaced (Inaudible 
.... ) 
Judge: "In the matter number 20 on the calendar on each of the third degree 
felonies it will be the order of the Court that this defendant server an 
indeterminate term of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison, an ! 
an order additionally you pay restitution in the sum of $2975, that you not 
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hold any positions of fiduciary responsibility. ·I am going to order that 
Count 1 of the matter run concurrent to the other time you are serving and 1 
that Count 2 run consecutive so that you will have one concurrent and one 
consecutive sentence so that there is some modicum of separate 
accountability. (Inaudible ... ) Board of Pardons will figure out what to d~ 
with that (Inaudible ... ) 
Mr Mulliner: "Thank you your Honor" 
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~ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 










Prosecutor: KELLY, DONNA M 
Defendant Present 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARVIS, GUNDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 15, 1964 
Video 














~ 2. SECURITIES FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 02/04/2004 No Contest 
HEARING 
{j This matter comes before the court for sentencing. The defendant is present in 
custody from the prison. Counsel addresses as to the recommendation. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY a 3rd Degree 
~ Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years 
in the Utah State Prison. 
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Case No: 031404403 Date: Mar 17, 2004 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the UTAH County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The sentence for count 1 is to run consecutive to the time the defendant is now 
serving. Count 2 is to run concurrent with the time the defendant is now serving. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The defendant is not to have any fiduciary responsibility. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution: Amount: $2975.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: VICTIM C/O STATE OF UTAH 
The amount of Restitution 
Date: 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
District Court Judge 
0031 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum D - R.078-80 February 3, 2016 Sentence, Judgment, Commitment order 
@ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.







4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031404403 FS 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Date: February 3, 2016 
~ Prosecutor: RAGAN, SHERRY E 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 15, 1964 
Audio 
Tape Number: 16-201 Tape Count: 10:24 
CHARGES 
2. SECURITIES FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 02/04/2004 No Contest 
1. SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 02/04/2004 No Contest 
HEARING 
(,j This matter comes before the Court for Oral Argument re: defendant's motion to correct 
illegal sentence. The defendant appears prose. 
The Court summarizes the matter. 
~ Mr. Mulliner addresses the Court stating argument in support of motion. 
10:37 Ms. Ragan states argument in opposition of an illegal sentence. 
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Case No: 031404403 Date: Feb 03, 2016 
10:45 Mr. Mulliner with closing. 
10:47 The Court accepts the transcript prepared by the defendant's brother. The Court 
finds the there was a clerical error. 
The Court, under Rule 30(b), corrects the clerical error. The Court also grants the 
Rule 22(e) motion and corrects the original sentence/commitment. 
Court orders the defendant serve no more than five years on each third degree felony, 
concurrently with each other. 
Count 1 will run concurrently with the St. George matter, #991500379. Count 2 will run 
consecutively to case #991500379. 
The Court orders the same restitution as before, $2975.00, payable to the victim. The 
Court orders the defendant not to obtain any employment where he would have any 
fiduciary responsibilities. 
The defendant is remanded back to the custody of the Department of Corrections. 
end time: 10:57 
SENTENCE PRISON 
GJ) Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years 
in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the 
Gj defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the UTAH County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined. 
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Case No: 031404403 Date: Feb 03, 2016 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Count 1 to run concurrently with case #991500379. Count 2 to run consecutively to 
991500379. 
Restitution Amount: $2975.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: C/O STATE OF UTAH VICTIM 
CUSTODY 
The defendant is present in the custody of the Department of Corrections Utah State 
Prison - Draper. 
End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page 
Case No: 031404403 Date: Feb 03, 2016 
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FILED 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
JUN 2 7 2017 
4TH DISTRiCT 
STATE Of UTAH 
UTAH COUftJTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
RULING and ORDER on 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 





Case No. 031404403 
Judge Low 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MA TIER comes before the court on Defendant's 
motion to correct an illegal sentence. Oral arguments were held on June 7, 2017, at 8:00' 
a.m., Adam Pomeroy representing Plaintiff and Douglas Thompson representing 
Defendant. 
RULING 
On March 17, 2004, the court, Judge Anthony Schofield presiding, sentenced 
Defendant. Defendant had previously been sentenced to prison for 1 to 15 years on a 
second degree felony in case number 991500379. In sentencing Defendant on the present 
case, Judge Schofield said, 
In the matter number 20 on the calendar on each of the third degree felonie~ 
it will be the order of the Court that this defendant serve an indeterminate f 
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term of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison .... I am going to 
order that Count 1 of the matter run concurrent to the other time you are , 
serving and that Count 2 run consecutive so that you will have one 
concurrent and one consecutive sentence so that there is some modicum of 
separate accountability. 
The court then indicated that the "Board of Pardons will figure out what to do with that.'~ 
I 
I 
The written order prepared after the hearing switched the counts so that count one, inste~d 
of count two, ran consecutively. 




sentence. Defendant argued that the court failed to address whether the counts in this casf 
should run consecutively or concurrently with each other as required by Utah Code§ 76-: 
3-40l(l)(a). On February 3, 2016, the court, Judge Claudia Laycock presiding, granted 
, 
@ the motion by correcting the clerical error regarding which count was to run consecutivejy 
I 
with the previous case and also by ordering the two counts in this case to run concurrent~ 
i 
with each other. 
On April 12, 2017, Defendant filed another motion, this time to correct the 2016 
sentence. He argues that the 2016 sentence is still illegal because it orders that the two 
counts in this case run concurrently with each other but only orders one of them to run ; 
consecutively with Defendant's previous sentence. This, Defendant notes, is impossible .. 
When a district court imposes an illegal sentence, it retains jurisdiction until a 
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valid sentence is imposed. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14 at 1 17. 1 The corrected sentence may be 
~ more severe than the previously imposed illegal sentence. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 
860 (Utah 1995). This is because, "[ a ]s a rule, illegal sentences are void and neither 
create rights nor impair or affect any rights." Yazzie, 2009 UT 14 at ,r 17. However, "there 
I 
may be circumstances under which even a corrected illegal sentence may be 
fundamentally unfair, and thus violative of due process." Id. at ,r 14 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). "Thus, when a district court corrects an illegal sentence, it must avoid 
any actions that may have a real, rather than very speculative, chilling effect on the 
constitutional right to appeal." Id (internal quotation marks omitted). "Nor may 
vindictiveness play a part in a new sentence that a defendant receives after successfully 
challenging an illegal sentence." Id. 
I 
In 2009, our supreme court cited, with approval, the Tenth Circuit's definition of: 
1 Rule 22( e ), prior to May I, 2017, stated, "The court may correct an illegal sentence, or ~ 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." It was modified on May 1, 2017, to ~ 
incorporate case law differentiating between "manifestly" illegal sentences that can be correcte 
at any time, and ordinary "run of the mill" errors in sentencing that can be reviewed only on 
appeal. This distinction evolved in order to curb abuses and prevent endless litigation of 1 
sentences. See e.g., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, 115, 84 P.3d 854 ("While rule 22(e) 
allows a court to review an illegal sentence at any time, it must be narrowly circumscribed to 
prevent abuse" and should only be applied to "patently" illegal sentences, not "ordinary or 'run-. 
of-the-mill' errors that should only be reviewed on appeal under rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of I' 
Appellate Procedure."). 
1 
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an illegal sentence: "An illegal sentence is one which is ambiguous with respect to the 
time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term 
required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a-
sentence which the judgment of conviction did not authorize." State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 
14,113,203 P.3d 984. The next year, it confirmed that Yazzie's definition was a good 
one. State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32,, 12,232 P.3d 1008. And finally, it incorporated 
Yazzie's language into the current version of rule 22(e). 
I 
Defendant argues that both the 2004 sentence and the 2016 attempt at correcting ~t 
@ are illegal because they are ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which thef 
are to be served and because they are internally contradictory. The state concedes that the 
2016 sentence is internally contradictory. The court agrees: the two counts are now 
explicitly ordered to run concurrently with each other, but only one of them is to run 
; 
consecutively to Defendant's previous sentence, making it impossible for them to actual~ 
run concurrently with each other. 
In Yazzie, the trial court originally failed to indicate whether the defendant's 
sentence would run concurrently with or consecutively to another case for which he had 
already been sentenced. Later, after the defendant violated probation, the court corrected 
~ the omission by ordering that his sentence run consecutively. This was held neither to 
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chill the defendant's rights to appeal nor to be vindictive, and it was upheld by the 
~ supreme court even though the district court-by the time it corrected the 
sentence-possessed, and likely considered, the defendant's behaviors committed after 
his original sentence. See id., ,r 23 (concurring opinion of Chief Justice Durham). 
Like in Yazzie, Defendant's 2004 sentence failed to explicitly address whether the 
two sentences in the present case would run concurrently with or consecutively to each 
other. Defendant asked the court to correct that and it did, in 2016, by ordering them to 
run concurrently with each other. But by correcting one error, the court created another: 
the two counts cannot run concurrently with each other as long as only one of them runs 
consecutively to his previous sentence. Defendant, therefore, now asks the court to undo 
the 2016 correction and correct the 2004 sentence in a manner that would run the two 
counts in this case consecutively to each other and concurrently with his previous 
sentence. This would reduce his total maximum sentence, for both cases, by five years. 
The state, on the other hand, asks the court to keep the 2016 correction and remove its 
internal contradiction by ordering that both counts in this case run consecutively to 
Defendant's previous sentence. This would leave Defendant's maximum sentence at its 
current 20 years. 
The court will do neither and simply restore Defendant's original sentence. 
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Defendant argues that the 2004 sentence was ambiguous and asks the court to adopt the 
interpretation that would reduce his sentence. Judge Schofield stated, "I am going to order 
that Count I of the matter run concurrent to the other time you are serving and that Count 
2 run consecutive." Defendant avers that this statement is not clear as to what count 2 was 
to run consecutively to: it could mean that count 2 was to run consecutively to count I or 
that it was to run consecutively to the sentence he received in case number 991500379. So 
he asks for the benefit of the doubt and requests that the court now order that count 2 run 
consecutively to count 1 and not to his sentence in case number 991500379. Again, 
~ reading this statement in this fashion would reduce his maximum sentence by 5 years 
because the sentences in this case would be completely subsumed within the one to 15 
year sentence he received in case number 991500379. 
The 2004 sentence is not ambiguous. It was clearly the court's intention to requir~ 
I 
i 
one of the counts in this case to run consecutively to Defendant's previous sentence. Th~ 
I 
I 
statement, "I am going to order that Count l of the matter run concurrent to the other tijb 
you are serving and that Count 2 run consecutive" is a grammatical parallelism. Such l 
grammatical structures are used to avoid the unnecessary repetition of words without 
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sacrificing meaning.2 In other words, it is clear that Judge Schofield meant, "I am going 
ij) to order that Count 1 of the matter run concurrent to the other time you are serving and 
that Count 2 run consecutive [ to the other time you are serving]." The proper 
interpretation of the court's statement was previously conceded by Defendant in a 
memorandum he filed with the court, pro se, on October 23, 2015. Citing to the 2004 
sentence, he stated, "To run Count I concurrent to the other time Mr. Mulliner was 
already serving and then Count 2 consecutive to the other time Mr. Mulliner was already 
serving results in Counts 1 and 2, the only offenses before this court, to run 
i 
I 
disparately-neither concurrent nor consecutive." Memorandum in Support of Rule 22(e) 
I 
Motion at 2 (emphasis added). Thus Defendant recognized the plain meaning of the 
court's parallel grammatical phrasing and accurately re-stated what count 2 was supposed 
to run consecutively to while simultaneously complaining that the court did not specify 
whether counts 1 and 2 would run concurrently or consecutively as to each other. 
Therefore, the 2004 sentence was not ambiguous about the sentence that count 2 was to · 
2 Parallel grammatical structure means "using the same pattern of words to show that tw(j) 
or more words or ideas are of equal importance and to help the reader comprehend what is being 
written." Http://examples.yourdictionazy.com/parallel-structure-examples.html (last visited on 
6/9/2017). For example, if one were to say, "Alice ran up the hill, and Brian didn't," the obvious 
meaning is that Brian did not run up the hill, not that he didn't like raspberries. The parallel J 
construction lets any reasonably attuned listener know that Brian and Alice are being evaluated f 
relation to the same activity. 
Page 7 of 11 
0226 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
run consecutively to. It was to run consecutively to "the other time [Defendant was] 
serving"; namely, case number 9915003 79. 
Other than supplying alternative interpretations of Judge Schofield's original 
sentence, Defendant offers no other basis for correcting his sentence to achieve any other 
purpose. He offers no evidence of anything he has done since his original sentence was 
imposed, and at oral arguments he objected to the court's inquiry into the underlying facts 
of either this case or the case for which he was previously sentenced. Therefore, the court 
has insufficient information to evaluate his motion on any basis other than effectuating 
Judge Schofield's original intent. 
Defendant's 2004 sentence, imposed by Judge Schofield, ordered count 1 to run 
~ concurrently with his previous sentence and count 2 to run consecutively to his previous 
sentence. The only correction it needed, if anything, was an indication as to whether the 
two counts in this case were to run concurrently or consecutively as to each other. Utah i 
Code§ 76-3-40l(l)(a) ("The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the ordet 
of judgment and commitment: (a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or 
consecutively to each other"). While the 2004 sentence was admittedly silent on this 
question, the answer inexorably follows from what was said: count 2 had to run 
(@ consecutively to count 1. There is simply no other way for count 1 to run concurrently 
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with Defendant's previous sentence and for count 2 to run consecutively to it. Therefore, 
if the 2004 sentence ever did require correction, the court could have, and should have, 
merely inserted the omitted-but implied-tenn that count 2 was to run consecutively to 
count 1. By ordering counts 1 and 2 to run concurrently with each other, the 2016 
sentence created a full-fledged internal contradiction and a legal impossibility not present 
in the 2004 sentence. Therefore, the court will vacate it. 
While the 2004 sentence is unusual, it is not prohibited. Utah Code section 76-3-
401(1) requires the court to state on the record whether sentences are to run concurrentl~ 
or consecutively as to each other and whether the sentences before the court are to run : 
concurrently or consecutively as to any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
The statute does not require different counts to be treated similarly; in other words, one 
count can run concurrently with a previous sentence and another can run consecutively tt 
that same sentence. Therefore, the 2004 sentence was a lawful sentence. It may have 
omitted a term, but that tenn was inescapably implied. The court will restore Defendant'$ 
original sentence and, like in Yazzie, correct it to include the omitted term. 
While it would be difficult to argue that this is a vindictive result, or that it may 
chill Defendant's right to appeal, the court will nevertheless address these potential 
~ concerns. It is neither vindictive nor chilling. First, it faithfully gives effect to Judge 
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Schofield's original intent to add five years, and no more than five years, to Defendant's 
(j maximum tenn. Second, Defendant conceded at oral arguments that both resolutions-the 
one he suggests and the one the court adopts today-result in the same recommended 
release date under the matrix adopted by the Sentencing Commission. Third, Defendant ! 
concedes that the parole board has already interpreted the 2004 and 2016 sentences to add 
five years to his maximum tenn. And fourth, while Defendant is entitled to a corrected 
sentence, he is not entitled to a reduced one. 
In light of the foregoing, the court will order Defendant's sentence to be corrected, 
once again, to undo the 2016 correction and to explicitly order what was already implied 
in the 2004 sentence; namely, that count 2 run consecutively to count 1. While it has 
taken 13 years and two motions, Defendant's sentence is now unambiguous with respect 
to the time and manner in which it is to be served; it is internally consistent; it includes aJI 
the tenns required to be imposed by statute; it is certain; and it is a sentence that is 
authorized by the judgment of conviction. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14 at ,I 13. In short, it is a 
lawful sentence. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, the court enters the following order: 
i 
I 
1. Defendant's sentence is corrected to require that he serve zero to five year~ 
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in the Utah State Prison on each of the two third-degree felonies in this 
case, that count 2 run consecutively to count 1, that count 1 run 
concurrently with Defendant's sentence in case number 991500379, and 
that count 2 run consecutively to Defendant's sentence in case number 
991500379. 
2. This is the order of the court. No additional order is necessary. Defendant ils 
I 
JUDGE LOW 
[MAILING CERTIFICATE ON FOLLOWING PAGE] 
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Addendum F - R.217-18 June 27, 2017 Sentence, Judgment, Commitment order 
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Date of birth: June 15, 1964 
Audio 
CHARGES 
The Order of the Court is stated below: 
Dated: June 27, 20)7 At the 1~i,[Ud:.!t:::., 
I 0: 13:31 AM /s/ Thom'}j· ;" ~. ,..;::~, l\ 
Distriqt <fr.-. · : ",; ·i -1i 
\~. \~ ~t-;.:· l by ~ ' i:.::·_\;:.1,... ,; :-:• 
/s/ ROSE ~ti~~··'\ 
District Court Cierk 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES 
2ND CORRECTED SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, 
COMMITMENT 




June 26, 2017 
2. SECURITIES FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 02/04/2004 No Contest 
1. SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 02/04/2004 No Contest 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years 
in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The prison time on count two is to run consecutively to count one. The prison time on 
count one is to run concurrently with the prison time on case number 991500379. The 
prison time on count two is to run consecutive to the prison time on case 991500379. 
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@ Case No: 031404403 Date: Jun 26, 2017 
The sentence is corrected based on the Ruling and Order on Defendant's Motion to 
@ Correct Illegal Sentence. 
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